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of the station such as to indicate an actual 
agency relationship. 279 Md. at 643, 370 
A.2d at 560. See Keitz v. National Paving 
Co., 214 Md. 479, 134 A.2d 296 (1957). 
The law of agency by estoppel is ex-
pressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§267 (1958) as follows: 
One who represents that another is his 
servant or other agent and thereby 
causes a third person to rely upon the 
care or skill of such apparent agent is 
subject to liability to the third person 
for harm caused by the lack of care or 
skill of the one appearing to be a serv-
ant or other agent as if he were such. 
This reliance must be actual and on the 
part of the person injured. It is not suffi-
cient that third parties direct the injured 
based on their faith in the apparent agen-
cy. 279 Md. at 644, 370 A.2d at 561. 
In order for Mabe to recover, the record 
must show such reliance on his part: 
reliance on the skill of the apparent agent. 
It was insufficient to show attraction to 
the station merely because it offered Bri-
tish Petroleum products. 279 Md. at 647, 
370 A.2d at 562. 
After its examination of the record, the 
court concluded that such reliance on 
Mabe's part was lacking; he entered this 
station rather than others in the proxi-
mate area because it provided B.P. pro-
ducts. In its interpretation of the record, 
the court cited a number of cases which 
held that the presence of an oil company's 
insignia was insufficient to establish the 
agency relationship (Levine v. Standard 
Oil Co., 249 Miss. 651, 163 So.2d 750 
(1964) and that the corporation's repre-
sentations were limited to showing the 
presence of its products. See Sherman v. 
Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 
916 (1960). 
In reversing the Court of Special Ap-
peals and denying recovery, the court 
found Mabe's attraction to the station to 
constitute no more than choice of prod-
ucts. 279 Md. at 649, 370 A.2d at 564. 
Judge Levine dissented vigorously. He 
noted that the court of Special Appeals 
sitting en bane had found the other way 
with only one dissent. The implication 
was that the solution of the case turned on 
an interpretation of the record, and that 
the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mabe was sufficient to sup-
port the jury verdict. Mabe had stated at 
trial that he not only bought B.P. prod-
ucts, but that he always dealt with B.P. 
It is apparent that this case is solved by 
a point over which reasonable men differ, 
and that there is considerable justification 
for a new trial. Instead, we are left with a 
narrow view of vicarious liability in this 
area, with limits of responsibility closely 
drawn and tightly circumscribed. 
Trounced For 
An Ounce 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
Noting that the Eighth Amendment has 
generally been invoked to proscribe "bar-
barous methods of punishment," a federal 
judge recently called upon the flexible 
and dynamic nature of the Constitution to 
grant a petition for habeas corpus relief 
from two consecutive 20-year sentences. 
Davis v. Zahradniek, 432 F. Supp. 444 
(W.O. Va. 1977). 
Petitioner Davis had been incarcerated 
after convictions in a Virginia court for 
possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute and for its actual distribution. The 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the 
convictions and the sentences and Davis 
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in 
the United States District Court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §2254. In addition to his 
Eighth Amendment claims, Davis con-
tended: that he was denied a trial by an 
impartial jury; that he was subjected to an 
illegal search and seizure; that the 
government failed to prove possession of 
marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the state failed to show that the 
substance involved was illegal contraband 
under the Virginia statute. 432 F.Supp. at 
446-447. 
The District Court rejected any argu-
ments alleging error in the conduct of the 
trial, and the case turned solely on the 
Eighth Amendment claim that the 20-
year sentence (plus a $20,000 fine) was 
constitutionally offensive in light of the 
nature of the offense. 
After considering whether the length of 
a sentence can serve as a basis for "habeas 
relief," the court indicated that the dis-
proportionality of the sentence in rela-
tionship to the offense constitutes ex-
cessiveness which is the "hallmark of 
cruel and unusual punishment." 432 
F.Supp. at 450. 
In granting the petition, the court con-
sidered four elements in its constitutional 
examination of the sentence. First con-
sidered was the nature of the offense. The 
fact that the amount of marijuana was less 
than nine ounces and the absence of any 
aspect of violence in the offense were cru-
cial to the disposition of this petition. 
Regarding the second factor, the legis-
lative purpose behind the punishment, it 
was eminently clear to the court that the 
legislative frustration of the sale of a ques-
tionably harmful drug could be served by 
a less severe punishment. 
Third, after an examination of punish-
ment for the same offense in other juris-
dictions, the court noted the relative ex-
cessiveness of the Virginia sentence. 
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Finally, the comparison was made be-
tween maximum sentences in Virginia for 
other offenses and the marijuana offense. 
Examples of other crimes drawing a 20-
year sentence in Virginia were second 
degree murder, malicious shooting with 
intent to maim, and attempted murder. 
The court thus concluded that the sen-
tences effected exceptional hardships on 
the defendant and constituted an im-
proprietous application of the law to the 
offenses so as to offend the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. 
Ban On 
Company 
Operated Gas 
Stations 
Upheld 
by Robert C. Becker 
Events surrounding the oil embargo of 
1973 should be fresh in memory. Great 
inconvenience to petroleum consumers 
and much misinformation and rumor sur-
rounding fuel shortages prompted the 
State Comptroller's office to propose and 
the General Assembly to pass, legislation 
regulating the operation of retail service 
stations. (Chapter 854 of the Laws of 
Maryland of 1974 amended by Chapter 
608 of the Laws of 1975; Maryland Code 
Annotated, Article 56 §157E). 
After July 1, 1977, no producer or 
refiner of petroleum products may open a 
retail service station to be operated by 
company employees, nor, after July 1, 
1978, may such producer or refiner con-
tinue to operate a retail service station by 
use of company employees; the stations 
must be operated by independent service 
station managers. Producers, refiners and 
wholesalers of petroleum products must 
extend voluntary allowances uniformly 
and equitably to the retail service stations 
they supply. The Comptroller will have 
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discretion to allow company operation of 
service stations, and extensions of the 
time limits of the act upon a showing of 
cause. 
Exxon Corporation brought an action 
in the circuit court for Anne Arundel 
County challenging the validity of the leg-
islation and asking that its enforcement be 
enjoined. Exxon soon was joined by other 
oil companies. The companies argued that 
the act denied them due process of law, 
unduly burdened interstate commerce, 
constituted a taking of property without 
compensation, denied them equal protec-
tion of the laws, was an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative authority, conflicted 
with federal legislation and was void for 
vagueness. The circuit court agreed with 
the companies and granted the relief 
sought. The State appealed this decision, 
and the Court of Appeals granted cer-
tiorari. 
Writing for the court, in Gov. of the 
State of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 
410, 370 A.2d 1102, Judge Eldridge 
answered the arguments of the companies 
point by point. The act does not deny due 
process of law because it is arguably of 
such benefit to the people of Maryland as 
to make it a legitimate exercise of the 
state's police power. It does not unduly 
burden interstate commerce because it 
regulates an activity which occurs entirely 
intrastate, and it is not so written as to 
protect a domestic industry by dis-
criminating against products in interstate 
commerce. 
The argument that the act is an un-
constitutional taking of property without 
compensation fails because there is in fact 
no taking of property at all. The oil com-
panies keep posseSSion of their service 
stations and their right to use them as 
service stations. The only restriction is 
that company employees may not operate 
the service stations. 
Equal protection of the laws is not 
denied where a classification is not purely 
arbitrary and has a rational basis. Here the 
classification is based on diligent research 
on the part of the Comptroller's office and 
the results of three hearings held as the 
act was being considered for passage. It 
cannot be said to be purely arbitrary and 
irrational. 
The delegation of power to the Comp-
troller is a reasonable one under the cir-
cumstances. It would be impossible for 
the legislature to antiCipate in detail the 
possible needs for modification of the 
terms of the act. 
This act does not conflict with the 
Robinson-Patman Act as charged, for the 
laws address different problems. The 
Maryland statute would, in the future, be 
held invalid only to the extent that it ac-
tually conflicted with federal legislation. 
No such conflict is found here. 
The statute is not void for vagueness 
because the terms held to be vague are 
terms of trade within the regulated indus-
try. Members of that industry may reason-
ably be held to understand their own ver-
nacular. 
Reaction to this decision has been 
strong, and appeals have been made to 
the United States Supreme Court by 
Exxon Corporation, Shell Oil Company 
and Continental Oil Company (docket 
numbers 77-10, 77-11, and 77-12 
respectively). The decision is most nota-
ble for its impact on the Corporation's 
control over their distribution of 
petroleum goods and services. In the bal-
ance is the future of the petroleum indus-
try as a wholly integrated enterprise. 
